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While They Waited: Pre-Obergefell Lives and the Law
of Nonmarriage
Michael J. Higdon
abstract. In the wake of Obergefell, the United States now has a large class of married, same-

sex couples whose relationships began at a time when marriage was unavailable to them. The law
must therefore wrestle with the question whether any portion of a pre-Obergefell relationship
should count toward the length of the ensuing marriage—an important question given the number
of marital beneﬁts tied directly to this calculation. As courts and legislators alike wrestle with this
diﬃcult question, they will need to examine how these couples ordered their relationships during
a time when “nonmarriage” was the only option. This Essay argues that such an examination provides a unique opportunity for the law to not only move toward true marriage equality, but also
reconsider its overall approach to nonmarriage in general. Speciﬁcally, this Essay identiﬁes three
lessons that can be gleaned from same-sex couples whose relationships spanned both sides of the
marriage equality movement. It argues that each of these lessons can help us cra� greater protections for nonmarital relationships.

introduction
To this day, couples who choose to cohabitate without marrying do so at their
legal peril. 1 For this reason, the law of cohabitation, and of nonmarriage more
generally, has been subject to quite a bit of criticism. 2 This Essay revisits that
criticism in light of the marriage equality movement, which of course scored a
major victory in Obergefell v. Hodges almost ﬁve years ago. 3

1.

2.
3.

Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage and Domestic Violence in the United States: New Perspectives About
Legal Strategies to Combat Domestic Violence, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 791, 802 (2003) (describing
cohabitation without marriage as “the riskiest form of intimate living arrangement”).
See infra Part II.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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Although Obergefell heralded the arrival of marriage equality, true equality
would require that individuals like James Obergefell and Edith Windsor be permitted not only to receive marriage licenses, but also to count the years they
spent in a marriage-like relationship as part of their marriage. A�er all, as Peter
Nicolas has pointed out, “[a]lthough many legal consequences ﬂow from the
mere fact of being married or unmarried, . . . the absolute length of one’s marriage . . . also aﬀect[s] a number of legal rights.” 4 For example, marriage length
can determine whether a surviving spouse is entitled to social security beneﬁts,
whether a divorcing spouse can receive alimony and in what amount, and
whether a particular piece of property was acquired during the marriage and,
thus, is subject to division at divorce. 5
In other words, Obergefell has spawned an interesting legal question: when
confronted with a class of people who only recently acquired the right to legally
marry the person of their choice, how does the law treat the marriage-like portions of their relationship that began during the pre-equality years? Of course,
this is not the ﬁrst time in American history when the law has had to confront
such questions. Similar issues arose following passage of the Thirteenth Amendment 6 as well as the Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 7 when former slaves
and mixed-race couples, respectively, were ﬁnally permitted to legally wed in
every state. Both of those instances, however, occurred during a time in which
there was not yet a body of law devoted to nonmarital relationships. Thus, the
plight of same-sex couples whose marriage-like relationships predated marriage
equality provides the ﬁrst real opportunity to analyze nonmarriage law’s eﬃcacy
both pre- and post-equality.
Obergefell’s promise of equality would seem to suggest we treat those years
as part of the marriage, but the existing law of cohabitation would suggest we
give them very little (if any) weight. When confronted with past situations involving opposite-sex couples, “the majority of courts appear[ed] to separate the
nonmarital period from the marital period.” 8 But the same-sex couples who now
ﬁnd themselves in this position are diﬀerent in one key respect—when their relationships began, nonmarriage was the only option. Thus, as the states struggle
with how to properly characterize and treat these pre-equality years, the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 397-98 (2017).
See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
388 U.S. 1 (1967). For a discussion of how states dealt with backdating marriages between
mixed-race couples following Loving, see Nicolas, supra note 4, at 424-25.
Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 18 n.83 (2017); see also Allison
Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1295 (2015) (“Because most legal rights
and responsibilities in a romantic relationship begin at the moment of marriage, courts o�en
do not assess premarital moments of commitment and partnership.”).
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resulting questions are quite instructive for the law of nonmarital relationships.
Indeed, much of the criticism that has been levied at the law of nonmarriage
takes on a new dimension when considered against this unique backdrop. This
Essay explores that criticism using a post-Obergefell lens.
This Essay does not, however, address when and how same-sex marriages
a�er Obergefell should be backdated to include earlier nonmarital periods. 9
Instead, this Essay accepts as fact that courts are beginning to understand
that Obergefell created a need for some form of backdating to help remedy the
vestiges of marriage inequality. As courts attempt to implement standards for
backdating, they will have to look at the ways in which same-sex couples ordered
their relationships while waiting for marriage equality. This Essay brings together the literatures on backdating and nonmarriage, and in doing so highlights
an important concern: as courts study pre-Obergefell relationships, they should
see how inapposite the current law of nonmarriage is to the reality of nonmarital
relationships. By underscoring existing arguments while giving rise to new criticisms, the pre-Obergefell lives of same-sex couples could beneﬁt future nonmarital partners in their quest for greater legal protections.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I explores how state courts have
counted the pre-Obergefell years that same-sex couples spent in marriage-like relationships. Part II then considers how recognizing these same-sex “marriages”
can better inform the law of nonmarriage.
i. when nonmarriage is the only option
The year 2015 marked a major milestone in the gay rights movement in the
United States. Gays and lesbians nationwide ﬁnally earned the right to marry
the person of their choice. Not since the late nineteenth century, when former
slaves were ﬁnally permitted to legally wed, 10 would Americans witness so large
a group simultaneously achieving the right to marry. For same-sex couples
9.

It is, a�er all, quite diﬃcult—as the scholars who have studied these issues can no doubt attest—to ask courts to look back in time to ascertain the precise point at which two parties
seemingly agreed that their relationship was the functional equivalent of a marriage. It is a
challenge to reconstruct time periods so long a�er the fact, which may be compounded in
cases where divorcing spouses see things quite diﬀerently. How is a court to decide between
those competing arguments? And what objective relationship markers oﬀer some degree of
certainty about the spouses’ past intentions? (Is it the day they started dating? Cohabitating?
Registered as domestic partners?) Without a marriage license, it is potentially impossible to
determine when two people had a meeting of the minds regarding marriage—especially if
these events occurred when marriage was not even a possibility. See e.g., Nicolas, supra note
4; Tait, supra note 8, at 1308; Lee-ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive
Application of Obergefell, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 873, 898 (2016).
10. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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opting to exercise this new right and convert their marriage-like relationships
into formal marriages, a diﬃcult question arose: should the law count those initial marriage-like years toward the length of their legal marriage?
To ignore those years would mean that “many same-sex relationships appear
artiﬁcially short in endurance when measured solely by reference to the couple’s
civil marriage date.” 11 More importantly, a number of legal consequences ﬂow
from the length of marriage, thus exposing these couples to certain detriments
should the full term of the relationship not be counted. At the federal level, Social
Security, 12 pension, 13 and immigration beneﬁts 14 are but three examples of beneﬁts that arise only if a couple is married for a certain amount of time. 15 State
law likewise conditions a number of protections on the length of the marriage,
including the availability and amount of alimony in a divorce. 16 Other marriage
protections only apply if the couple was married at the time of a certain event,
such as property acquisition. 17
Consider a same-sex couple who, prohibited from marrying, lived in a marriage-like relationship from 1990 to 2015. On the heels of Obergefell, the couple
married in 2015, but divorced in 2018. In most states, the law would only treat
the property acquired between 2015 and 2018 as marital property subject to division, even if the couple could show that their relationship was equivalent to a
longer marriage. One could of course make the same argument about an opposite-sex couple who enjoyed a long cohabitation period prior to marriage, but
the opposite-sex couple at least had the option of marriage, while the same-sex
couple was forced to wait for a change in the law.

11.
12.

13.
14.

15.
16.

17.

Nicolas, supra note 4, at 397.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)(1)(E) (2018) (deﬁning “widow” as a “surviving wife [who] was
married to [the deceased] for a period not less than nine months immediately prior to the day
on which [the deceased] died”).
See 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(1)(A) (2018) (requiring a marriage of at least nine months).
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) (2018) (“[A] petition may not be approved to grant an alien immediate relative status or preference status by reason of a marriage . . . until the alien has resided outside the United States for a 2-year period beginning a�er the date of the marriage.”).
See Nicolas, supra note 4, at 397 (cataloguing others).
Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization of Family
Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 359 (“What is emerging as
salient in the places implementing alimony guidelines are two variables, length of marriage
and earning diﬀerential.”).
Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides
a Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 573 (1995) (“A majority of states limit the property subject
to division to marital property.”); see also Nicolas, supra note 4, at 398 (providing other examples of where “the length of a couple’s marriage relative to some other legally salient event
determines whether they will be able to exercise a given right”).
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Currently, treating the pre-marriage relationship as nothing more than cohabitation would place a profound disability on such couples. A�er all, the law
currently oﬀers, at most, only constrained protections for nonmarital relationships. 18 Speciﬁcally, state law protections for cohabitants typically require the
parties to have entered into an agreement regarding their respective rights. 19 A
handful of states simply refuse to enforce cohabitation agreements. 20 Even then,
states will o�en condition recovery on how closely the nonmarital relationship
resembles a traditional marriage. Accordingly, for the same-sex couples whose
relationships began prior to marriage equality, something more is required if the
law is to honor Obergefell’s promise of ensuring them “the rights, beneﬁts, and
responsibilities” of marriage. 21
Just two years later, the Court clariﬁed in Pavan v. Smith that Obergefell “held
the relevant state laws unconstitutional to the extent they treated same-sex couples diﬀerently from opposite-sex couples.” 22 Thus, Pavan stands for the proposition that, under Obergefell, states must do more than just permit same-sex
couples to wed. But, in their attempts to provide true marriage equality, how are
states to treat the pre-equality years when same-sex couples had no option but
to form nonmarital relationships? A brief survey of the law reveals that, thus far,
the results are mixed.
On the more positive end, consider the case of Debra Parks, who ended a
forty-year relationship with her partner in 2017. 23 During this time, the two had
bought a house and “other property together, had joint bank accounts, used each
18.

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1402-03
(2001) (describing the law of cohabitation as “not particularly generous” given that “[o]nly a
small percentage of cohabitants will have even a possibility of legal recovery when their relationships end.”).
William A. Reppy, Jr., Choice of Law Problems Arising When Unmarried Cohabitants Change
Domicile, 55 SMU L. REV. 273, 273-74 (2002) (“[O]nly a handful of American jurisdictions
takes the position that the cohabitants, having made no contract, share a legal status . . . creating property rights and obligations of the cohabitants.”). While some states permit implied
agreements, others require that they be express, sometimes in writing. Id. at 274. The two
states that ignore the contract approach and instead look at the nature of the couple’s relationship are Nevada and Washington. See Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”:
A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1280 (2015) (“Washington, and perhaps
Nevada, have developed an alternative status-based regime for cohabiting couples.”).
Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 2020 (2018) (“Georgia,
Illinois, and Louisiana seem to go further, rejecting any claim arising from a cohabitant relationship.”).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
See Andrew Dys, Same-Sex Legal Groundbreaker: Judge Says Rock Hill Couple Married in S.C.
for Decades, HERALD (Rock Hill) (March 19, 2017), https://www.heraldonline.com/news/local/article139540723.html [https://perma.cc/439J-W9UN].
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other on tax documents, and lived together until 2016.” 24 The couple resided in
South Carolina, which did not permit same-sex marriage until 2014 but does
recognize common-law marriage. 25 When Parks sued to have her relationship
declared a common-law marriage, the judge agreed. In essence, the court ruled
that not only had the two entered into a common-law marriage, but that it had
begun in 1987 when Parks divorced her husband. 26 Other states have similarly
used common-law marriage when dealing with individuals whose same-sex
partners died before they were able to legally wed. 27
In states that do not permit common-law marriage, some courts have attempted to oﬀer similar beneﬁts by backdating the marriage to an earlier date
when the couple was incapable of legally marrying. Importantly, however, these
courts have only done so when the parties can prove that, but for the legal prohibition against same-sex marriage, they likely would have wed. For instance,
an Oregon court applied the marital presumption to an unmarried same-sex
couple, holding that the mother’s lesbian partner was the child’s legal parent. 28
The court did so by noting that same-sex and opposite-sex couples were not
similarly situated—one group could marry, while the other could not. 29 Thus,
for purposes of applying the marital presumption, the court held that “the salient
question is whether the same-sex partners would have chosen to marry before the
child’s birth had they been permitted to.” 30 On that basis, the court reversed the
lower court’s grant of summary judgment, ruling that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the parties would have wed. 31
At least one court, however, has refused to extend that beneﬁt to same-sex
couples when they failed to promptly wed a�er gaining that right, essentially
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Nicolas, supra note 4, at 416-18 (discussing cases).
In re Madrone, 350 P.3d 495 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). Under the marital presumption, courts presume that when a married woman gives birth, the child’s father is her husband. See Michael
J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1493 (2018). Today, the presumption frequently comes into play when a married woman gives birth using artiﬁcial insemination. See, e.g., Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between
the Men Involved in the Artiﬁcial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 970
(2009) (“[A]rtiﬁcial insemination is treated as just another way for a woman to get pregnant . . . . [Under the marital presumption], her husband is presumed to be the father of the
child.”).
In re Madrone, 350 P.3d at 503.
Id. at 501 (“Given that same-sex couples were until recently prohibited from choosing to be
married, the test for whether a same-sex couple is similarly situated to the married oppositesex couple . . . cannot be whether the same-sex couple chose to be married or not.”).
Id. at 503.
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punishing them for not being married. In Ferry v. De Longhi America, Inc., a case
arising out of California, Patrick Ferry and Randy Sapp started living together
in 1985. 32 In 1993, they “were married in a religious ceremony performed by a
religious leader pursuant to the principles of [their] beliefs.” 33 The two men
would live together until December 2013, when Sapp tragically died as a result
of a heater that allegedly malfunctioned. 34 When Ferry brought a wrongful
death action, the manufacturer moved to dismiss on the basis that Ferry was not
Sapp’s legal spouse and, thus, lacked standing. 35 The court agreed, noting that
because same-sex marriage became legal in California in June 2013, the two men
could have legally wed prior to Sapp’s death if they had so intended. 36 In essence,
the two men had lived as a married couple for over thirty years but were punished for not obtaining a marriage license in the six months between ﬁnally gaining the right to do so and Sapp’s death.
Finally, some states have passed legislation on the subject. Just like the court
decisions, however, not all legislation on this topic is fully inclusive of the preequality years. Speciﬁcally, as Nicolas has found, seven states that permitted
same-sex couples to enter into domestic partnerships or civil unions pre-Obergefell have since “created a seamless mechanism for converting civil unions or
domestic partnerships to marriages.” 37 Of those, seven have legislated that the
marriage began on the date the relationship was converted to a formal marriage.
The remainder set the date as the one on which the couple entered into the domestic partnership or civil union. 38 Although the latter approach allows the
same-sex couple to count more of their relationship toward the subsequent marriage, it still only counts those portions that came a�er the couple entered into
the domestic partnership or civil union—formal relationship options that may
not have been available earlier in the couple’s relationship.
Given how little time has elapsed since Obergefell, and the complexities inherent in the question of when and how to backdate marriage, 39 it is unclear how
states will ultimately strike the balance between true marriage equality and the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

276 F. Supp. 3d 940, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The relationship actually started the previous year.
Id. at 942-43.
Id. at 943. According to Ferry, “[h]ad it been possible to do so, they would have obtained a
marriage license.” Id. (internal quotes omitted).
Id.
Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 949-50. Per the court, “the act of obtaining a marriage license is an administrative burden that all couples must bear if they wish to avail themselves of the legal rights and privileges
of a formal marriage.” Id. at 952.
Nicolas, supra note 4, at 405.
Id. at 405-06 (discussing the various legislative approaches).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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law’s reluctance to protect nonmarital relationships. Nonetheless, as discussed
below, simply recognizing the existence of this need vis-à-vis the same-sex relationships that predated Obergefell provides critical commentary on the current
state of nonmarriage law in the United States. Speciﬁcally, those relationships
provide an illuminating example of not only the impediments that keep couples
from legally marrying, but also the degree to which domestic relationships have
evolved since the law of nonmarriage was ﬁrst developed.
ii. how marriage equality informs the debate over
nonmarriage
This Part explores how “marriages” that eﬀectively began before couples had
the ability to legally wed help illuminate the limitations of nonmarriage law as it
exists today. With nonmarriage being the only option for same-sex couples, we
have a vast sample size of individuals who conducted their relationships in a
nonmarital form. By studying those pre-equality relationships, there is much the
law can learn about nonmarriage, both as a social phenomenon and as a legal
construct. This Part focuses on three discrete lessons the law can take from such
a study: (A) the role choice plays in a couple’s decision not to marry; (B) the
degree to which the law of cohabitation relies on traditional marriage as a benchmark for determining which nonmarital relationships merit protection; and (C)
the way in which the law has used nonmarriage as a basis for withholding beneﬁts and punishing those who do not conform to societal expectations.
A. Choice
One of the more compelling characteristics shared by same-sex couples who,
pre-Obergefell, lived in a marriage-like state is the fact that nonmarriage was their
only option. Although their lack of choice stemmed from discriminatory marriage laws, the reality is that many couples, regardless of whether they are sameor opposite-sex, likewise “opt” out of marriage as a result of other circumstances
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beyond their control. 40 In fact, many cohabitating couples do eventually wed. 41
That has not stopped courts, however, from treating couples’ decisions to cohabitate as though they represent a conscious choice to never marry—one for
which they must forever bear the consequences.
Consider, for instance, a 1994 Mississippi case in which Elvis Davis, a woman
who spent thirteen years cohabitating with the father of her child, brought a
claim arguing that she was entitled to an equitable distribution of the couple’s
property. 42 The two held themselves out as husband and wife, and Elvis had
worked in her partner’s businesses and also as a homemaker for him and their
daughter. 43 During the course of their relationship, her partner’s net worth had
grown from $850,000 to over $7 million. 44 Nonetheless, the court refused her
claim. In doing so, the court made much of the fact that, at some unspeciﬁed
point in the relationship, Elvis declined a marriage proposal. 45 Thus, the court
seemingly gave no consideration to any other event in the evolution of the couple’s thirteen-year relationship other than that one point in time when Elvis expressed a desire not to marry.
When it comes to the same-sex couples whose relationships began pre-Obergefell, however, courts cannot rely on conscious choice when deciding what level
of protection to aﬀord the couple’s premarital relationship. Indeed, for those
couples, there was no choice whatsoever when it came to marriage versus

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and Modeling Cohabitation: New Perspectives from Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 995 (2005) (presenting data that
“call into question the assumption o�en made in research of a conscious decision-making
process leading to cohabitation”). According to Kaiponanea Matsumura, “[m]ost nonmarital
relationships develop organically with questions about legal ramiﬁcations arising a�er the
partners have intertwined their lives in various respects.” Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Consent
to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1019 (2018). Or, stated diﬀerently: “Most cohabitation evolves from a dri� into sleeping more and more frequently together and a gradual
accumulation of possessions at one residence . . . . [T]here is only a mutual, o�en unspoken,
recognition of the desire to be together, with little attention given to planning for the relationship.” Eleanor D. Macklin, Nonmarital Heterosexual Cohabitation, MARRIAGE & FAM. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 6; see also Kathryn S. Vaughn, Comment, The Recent Changes to the Texas
Informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L. REV.
1131, 1153 (1991) (“Because so many couples ‘dri�’ into cohabitation arrangements, there is
not always an agreement to be husband and wife even though the couples live in all respects
like a married couple.”).
See Estin, supra note 18, at 1384 (“Sixty percent of opposite-sex cohabitants in the United
States go on to marry each other, and this o�en happens quickly.”).
Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931 (Miss. 1994).
Id. at 932-33.
Id.
Id. at 936 (“When opportunity knocks, one must answer its call. Elvis Davis failed to do so
and thus her claim is all for naught.”).
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nonmarriage. To couples whose relationships began more than twenty years ago,
the thought of marriage versus nonmarriage may never have occurred. Marriage
equality was a topic that only seriously emerged in the mid-1990s, 46 and the ﬁrst
state to legalize same-sex marriage did not do so until 2003. 47 Thus, the samesex couples who lived in premarital, pre-Obergefell cohabitation disrupt the idea
that nonmarriage is something people elect. For that reason, courts must look
beyond choice and instead take into account that, in some instances, cohabitation serves as either a temporary status on the path to marriage or simply a status
that unfolded organically. 48 Regardless, it should not be viewed as a complete
rejection of marriage.
It could very well be that marriage simply did not make economic sense for
a cohabiting couple. A�er all, economic hardship is one of the qualities shared
by those most likely to cohabitate. 49 “As compared with their married counterparts, unmarried parents are younger, lower income, less educated, disproportionately nonwhite, and more likely to have children from multiple partners.” 50
Given that cohabitation is more prevalent among marginalized groups, courts
and legislatures should be more cautious when it comes to dismissing these relationships as the product of a bad decision. For people within these particular
social groups, perhaps the decision not to wed was, like the same-sex couples
who pre-dated Obergefell, due to circumstances beyond their control. 51
Such a realization could propel states to focus on the real question that arises
in the context of nonmarriage: regardless of why the parties came to be in this
46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97
TEX. L. REV. 43, 62 (2018) (noting that “the same-sex marriage issue became salient in the
mid-1990s”).
See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). As one commentator
has written: “I went to the Netherlands in 1998, just a�er marriage had become equal there.
And it was an amazing feeling . . . because I had never imagined that possibility.” Laura J.
Kendall, Dancing with My Grandma: Talking with Robyn Ochs About Complex Identities and Simple Messages in the Marriage Equality Movement, in BISEXUALITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 181,
199 (M. Paz Galupo ed., 2008).
Further, to the extent the decision to now wed does involve choice, it would be a mistake to
assume that both parties have equal say given that “[t]he decision to marry . . . rests on which
individual has the most bargaining power.” Antognini, supra note 8, at 57.
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At What
Point, If Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 50 FAM. L.Q. 215, 230 (2016)
(ﬁnding that many cohabitating couples exist “at or below the poverty level”).
Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 167, 186-87 (2015) (citations omitted); see also Matsumura, supra note 40, at 1038
(“[L]ess wealthy and less educated adults are more likely to be in comparatively unstable relationships.”).
See Ira Mark Ellman, Marital Roles and Declining Marriage Rates, 41 FAM. L.Q. 455, 485 (2007)
(“The unmarried have not selected their situation, they have settled for it.”).
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form of relationship, how should the law treat them when the relationship ends?
As Albertini Antognini has explained, the real focus should be on “whether a
nonmarital separation should be treated like a divorce . . . the most direct comparison accessible to courts.” 52 Perhaps recognizing the existence of same-sex couples who had no choice in the matter will help courts begin to focus on answering
this more fundamental question. Doing so will help couples in non-marriage
relationships across the board, whether their decision to cohabitate was made for
them by the law, outside circumstances, or was their conscious choice.
B. Traditional Marriage as a Benchmark
Even when states do provide some remedies for cohabitating couples, those
protections are o�en premised on outdated, stereotypical notions of what marriage should look like. Same-sex relationships that predated marriage equality,
however, force courts to confront just how inappropriate that benchmark is
when adjudicating claims by cohabitants. In essence, courts must instead ask a
new question: For couples who never thought marriage would be an option for
them, how did they structure their relationships? It is an important question
given that a consistent criticism of the law of nonmarriage has been courts’ practice of conditioning recovery and beneﬁts on how closely the relationship looks
like marriage. 53 Under this judicial approach, the only people who are protected
are those whose relationships conform “to an amalgam of social, cultural, or legal
standards that approximate marriage.” 54 The problem with this limited protection is its assumption that the degree to which a nonmarital relationship deserves
legal protection is tied to how closely it approximates a stereotypical marriage.
Many have criticized Obergefell for “reif[ying] marriage as a key element in
the social front of family, further marginalizing nonmarital families.” 55 Others
have gone so far as to characterize the majority opinion as “a love letter to

52.

See Antognini, supra note 8, at 56.
Although the typical approach is to deny cohabitants recovery if the relationship is not suﬃciently marriage-like, there are some instances where courts have denied recovery if the relationship looks too much like marriage. Id. at 10-58. Antognini provides an in-depth examination of these cases, contrasting “[t]he cases that require the nonmarital relationship to be
marriage-like in distributing property or awarding alimony” with those where “if the relationship looks anything like marriage, . . . courts prevent the plaintiﬀ from recovering.” Id. at
59.
54. Matsumura, supra note 40, at 1021.
55. Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
23, 23 (2015).
53.
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marriage,” 56 frequently quoting Justice Kennedy’s statement that “[n]o union is
more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, ﬁdelity,
devotion, sacriﬁce, and family.” 57 Thus, as one article states, “[i]n the process of
explaining how vital marriage is to individuals and society, Obergefell repeatedly
shames those who do not marry.” 58
One of the more interesting aspects of Obergefell, however, is the way in
which the opinion arrives at the conclusion that same-sex marriage falls within
the fundamental right to marry. Speciﬁcally, the Court did so by identifying four
essential “principles and traditions” related to marriage that justify its classiﬁcation as a fundamental right—principles and traditions that, according to the
Court, apply equally to same-sex couples 59: 1) “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy;” 60 2) marriage “supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals;” 61 3) marriage “safeguards children and families and
thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education;” 62 and 4) “marriage is a keystone of our social order . . . , without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress.” 63
By breaking marriage down into these four “essential attributes,” while
seemingly excluding more stereotypical assumptions of marriage, such as gender
roles, 64 the question arises as to whether Obergefell might nonetheless oﬀer some
hope for those in nonmarital relationships. A�er all, if marriage continues to
serve as the benchmark for whether cohabitants are entitled to legal protections,
Obergefell could lead to a reﬁnement of that comparison—one that ultimately
beneﬁts cohabitants and individuals in other nonmarital relationships. Courtney
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1212
(2016).
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
Leonore Carpenter & David S. Cohen, A Union Unlike Any Other: Obergefell and the Doctrine
of Marital Superiority, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 124, 126 (2015); see also Gregg Strauss, What’s
Wrong with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 631 (2018) (“Obergefell’s gloriﬁcation of marriage is wrong, not because it was harmful or hurtful, but because its rhetoric denies the equal
dignity of citizens in nonmarital families.”).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2590 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)).
Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
See Cary Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conﬂict over “Inherent Diﬀerences” Between
the Sexes, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 187–88 (2017) (“The Court observed in Obergefell that
much of what had once seemed ‘natural’ about marriage was subsequently revealed to reﬂect
stereotyped conceptions of men’s and women’s roles.”).
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Joslin makes the case that “[t]hese principles must be applied equally to nonmarriage.” 65
The same-sex couples who were forced to wait for the right to marry lend
some support to Joslin’s argument. As an initial matter, the nature of Obergefell’s long-term, nonmarital relationship with his partner, upon which the Court
relied when pointing out the core similarities between same- and opposite-sex
marriages, was unlikely to have changed in any qualitative way as a result of receiving a marriage license. Thus, it is diﬃcult to justify holding those pre-equality years against them when deciding marital beneﬁts. The question then becomes whether the law should ever automatically give marriage a virtual
monopoly on the legal protections aﬀorded individuals in domestic relationships. In fact, as Matsumura has detailed, the law has already carved out areas in
which “acts distinct from formal requirements can sometimes move people from
the legal category of unmarried to married.” 66 Is it really justiﬁed in refusing to
do so when that refusal punishes those in an economically vulnerable position
for being in a relationship that, per the Supreme Court, already shares the essential attributes of the one relationship status that is protected?
There is one other question, however, that arises in this context when looking at the pre-equality relationships of same-sex couples. Given that many of the
individuals in same-sex relationships grew up in a world where marriage was
not possible and their relationships were marginalized (if not demonized),
would it not be reasonable to assume that those relationships would look somewhat diﬀerent from traditional marriages? If so, should the law accept those differences or simply ignore them? 67 This concern harkens back to one raised by
Paula Ettelbrick in 1989, when the same-sex marriage movement was in its embryonic stages: “The moment we argue . . . that we should be treated as equals
because we are really just like married couples and hold the same values to be
true, we undermine the very purpose of our movement and begin the dangerous
process of silencing our diﬀerent voices.” 68 Perhaps the courts’ recognition of the

65.

Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425,
476 (2017).
66. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999, 2006 (2017).
67. For a fascinating case in which a court in the 1980s applied a more essentialist view of “family”
to determine that a surviving member of a same-sex couple could qualify as a “family member” for purposes of a rent-control statute, see Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49,
53-54 (1989) (“[A] more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two
adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and
ﬁnancial commitment and interdependence.”).
68. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in WE ARE EVERYWHERE: A
HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK IN GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS 757, 758 (Mark Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 1997).
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ways in which same-sex couples structured their lives prior to Obergefell could
be instructive in broadening the law’s conceptions of modern relationships.
One of the diﬀerences that bears mentioning is, of course, gender. With
same-sex marriage, courts can no longer rely on the stereotype of the working
husband and homemaker wife. This could be beneﬁcial to the law of nonmarriage, which is not immune to such stereotypes. As Antognini points out, to the
degree that the law of nonmarriage has typically employed marriage as a barometer for what a relationship should look like, “[t]he overarching deﬁnition of
marriage that these decisions impose is one steeped in archetypal gender relations.” 69 With the legalization of same-sex marriage, however, the law must
“confront[] the sleeping dog, by challenging the rigidity of gender role and identity that conspires with political will to deny the creative possibility and richness
in all lives of committed intimate relation.” 70 Thus, gender is a prime example
of how looking at same-sex couples whose relationships predate Obergefell can
provide a richer understanding of nonmarital relationships, enabling the states
to oﬀer more meaningful protections without relying solely on traditional marriage. 71
C. Social Conformity
Finally, as courts attempt to ascertain how to treat the nonmarital portions
of same-sex relationships that began pre-Obergefell, they must be mindful of the
ways in which the law of nonmarriage has historically been used to punish social
deviance. A�er all, within this area of the law, courts have been known to apply
diﬀerent standards in diﬀerent contexts to eﬀectively punish someone who failed
to conform to societal expectations of domestic relations. 72 For same-sex couples
whose relationships began pre-Obergefell, there is the very real danger that states
that dislike marriage equality could hold any post-Obergefell period of cohabitation against them, eﬀectively punishing them for their failure to conform to

69.

Antognini, supra note 8, at 60.
John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
1119, 1149 (1999).
71. This is not to suggest, of course, that all nonmarital relationships should be aﬀorded rights
equal to marriage. Indeed, as June Carbone and Naomi Cahn have pointed out, “[n]onmarriage is not one single institution, but instead is a continuum of relationships.” June Carbone
& Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 94 (2016). The point here is merely that in
attempting to determine which nonmarital relationships are entitled to economic protection,
standards that are broader than “marriage-like” should be employed.
72. See id. at 60 (“Marriage law has long served to institutionalize expectations about appropriate
conduct by reinforcing broadly shared community norms and ‘channeling’ intimate relationships into marriage.” (citations omitted)).
70.
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societal expectations. One example already exists. In Ferry, the court refused to
treat a same-sex couple’s pre-equality years as a marriage, given that they theoretically had six months to marry before one of the partners died. 73 The hypocrisy in such an approach is alarming. Same-sex couples were punished during
the pre-Obergefell years because their relationships, which failed to conform to
the traditional model of “one man and one woman,” were deemed unworthy of
being treated as a legal marriage. Once marriage equality did become an option,
same-sex couples were then punished for not, in short order, conforming to the
legal and societal expectation that couples must wed to protect themselves from
economic harm.
Cases like Ferry are troubling in that they harken back to the period a�er the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment when former slaves gained the right to
marry. As historian Tera W. Hunter discusses in her latest book, Bound in Wedlock, prior to emancipation, slaves were permitted to “marry,” but such unions
had absolutely no legal eﬀect. 74 With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,
however, former slaves could enter into legal marriages. Yet for those who failed
to promptly legalize their pre-emancipation unions, states now had another way
to subjugate them. Speciﬁcally, “[t]hose who were already in cohabitating relationships were told to immediately legalize their unions and legitimize their children and grandchildren.” 75 At least one southern state gave the former slaves just
six months to wed or be subject “to criminal prosecution for adultery and fornication.” 76 As Katherine Franke has discussed, this “served to domesticate African
American people who were either unaware of, or ignored, the formal requirements of marital formation and dissolution, or who chose to conduct their intimate sexual relationships in ways that fell outside the matrimonial norms of Victorian society.” 77
Of course, there are many diﬀerences between marriages involving former
slaves and same-sex couples—not the least of which is the fact that LGBT people
were already viewed as persons under the Constitution when Obergefell was

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN WEDLOCK: SLAVE AND FREE BLACK MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6 (2017) (“As chattel, slaves were objects, not subjects. Marriage for them
was not an inviolable union between two people, but an institution deﬁned and controlled by
the superior relationship of master to slave.”). Indeed, in the context of a slave wedding, the
typically “till death do you part” vow was changed to “until death or distance do you part,”
recognizing the right of the slave owner to unilaterally separate the couple at any point. Id.
Id. at 236.
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399,
1421 (2004) (noting postbellum marriage law in Florida).
Katherine M. Franke, Becoming A Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American
Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 257 (1999).
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issued. But as Ferry indicates, some similarities exist in the way marriage equality
could go from being a beneﬁt to a detriment if it is employed a means for the
majority to impose social conformity on the minority. 78 A�er all, both examples
involve groups of people who had spent years ordering their lives around the fact
that marriage was not an option. As a result, some of the same-sex couples whose
relationships began pre-Obergefell may not immediately, or ever, exercise their
right to marry. Thus, like former slaves who were punished for not immediately
conforming their relationships to a legal institution to which they had only just
been given access, the law must be mindful of similar expectations being imposed on same-sex couples. It is true that Ferry represents a single instance in
which a court has punished a same-sex couple for a delay in formalizing a relationship that had already existed for some time, but other courts could follow
suit if they are not mindful of the history behind the law of nonmarriage—a history that illuminates the ways in which the law has used nonmarital relationships
as a tool to punish those who do not conform. Hopefully, greater awareness of
this propensity will discourage states from following a similar path with not only
same-sex couples whose relationships predated Obergefell, but any couple whose
relationship is at odds with societal norms.
conclusion
Since Obergefell, many same-sex couples have solemnized relationships that
endured the time during which marriage was not an option. But true equality
demands that at least some of those nonmarital years be counted alongside the
marital years in determining the length of these “new” marriages. As courts
wrestle with how best to do so, there is much the law can learn about the reality
of nonmarriage in the United States. Speciﬁcally, the same-sex couples who were
forced to bide their time in marriage-like relationships created unions that further illustrate both the nature and the legal struggle of nonmarital relationships.
States and courts would do well to pay close attention, given that these relationships could greatly inform the law of nonmarriage going forward. Thus, Obergefell may ultimately hold a positive impact not only for same-sex marriage, but
for other forms of domestic relationships that exist on the legal and societal periphery. Although not enough time has passed for the true impact of the Obergefell arguments to be determined, Nan Hunter’s words as to the opinion’s legacy
are particularly salient in this context: “[n]ot only is it far too soon to know the

78.

See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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answer, but in fact, the answer does not yet exist. It is up to us as citizens to
create it.” 79
Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. My sincerest appreciation to
all the participants at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of
Law’s Roundtable on Nonmarriage for their invaluable feedback.

79.

Nan D. Hunter, The Undetermined Legacy of ‘Obergefell v. Hodges,’ NATION (June 29, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/the-undetermined-legacy-of-obergefell-v-hodges
[https://perma.cc/2EFJ-YGSN].
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